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I. INTRODUCTION
This article explores the effects of a particular legal rule. The rule is that
employees' pre-dispute arbitration agreements are enforceable "save upon
such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract."
This rule is embodied in a 1991 Supreme Court case, Gilmer v.
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.,2 and lower court cases applying and
extending it.3
The Gilmer rule is quite controversial. Many Gilmer opponents charge
that the Gilmer rule harms employees. 4 In contrast, Gilmer's proponents
praise its rule as beneficial to employees. 5 Both groups rely on empirical
studies in making these assertions. 6 These studies, however, are at best
inconclusive on whether the Gilmer rule benefits or harms employees. 7 Both
sides in the employment arbitration debate have been too quick to claim that
their views are supported by the empirical evidence. In the employment
arbitration debate, as in other debates, we should be skeptical of declarations
that empirical studies "prove" one side of the debate to be correct.
Recognizing the inconclusiveness of existing empirical studies of
employment arbitration, some commentators call for more such studies.8
This may, however, throw good money after bad. Empirical studies are
vulnerable to the possibility that the studied cases going to arbitration are
systematically different from the studied cases going to litigation.9 For this
reason, empirical studies are, at best, an incomplete path toward
understanding the effects of the Gilmer rule.
19 U.S.C. § 2 (1994 & Supp. 2000).
2 Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991).
3 See infra notes 22-23.
4 See infra notes 24-25.
5 See infra note 93.
6 See infra Part V.
71d.
8 E.g., Michael Z. Green, Debunking the Myth of Employer Advantage From Using
Mandatory Arbitration for Discrimination Claims, 31 RUTGERS L.J. 399, 443 n.158
(2000).
91Id.
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II. EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION DEFINED
A. Employment Distinguished From Labor
Employment law is customarily distinguished from labor law.
"Employment law" applies to all employees, while "labor law" applies only
to employees represented by a labor union.10 The employment/labor
distinction is also central to the terminology of arbitration. "Employment
arbitration" arises out of a contract between an employer and an individual
employee, while "labor arbitration" arises out of a collective bargaining
agreement between an employer and a union. Employment arbitration is the
subject of this article. This article does not directly address labor arbitration,
which is governed by a very different set of laws and practices, 11 but much
of its reasoning applies equally in the labor context.
B. Employment Arbitration Law
Employment arbitration is governed primarily by the Federal Arbitration
Act (FAA).' 2 Enacted in 1925, the FAA is resolutely pro-contract. Section 2
of the FAA provides that arbitration agreements are enforceable "save upon
such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any
contract." 13 This language reflects an intent to place arbitration agreements
"upon the same footing as other contracts" and to reverse judicial hostility to
the enforcement of arbitration agreements.' 4 The FAA's enactment was
10 Comparing the Hornbooks on Employment Law and Labor Law highlights this
point. See generally ROBERT A. GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW: UNIONIZATION
AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING (1976); MARK A. ROTHSTEIN ET AL., EMPLOYMENT LAW
(2d ed. 1999).
11 See, e.g., IAN R. MACNEIL ET AL., FEDERAL ARBITRATION LAW § 11.3.1 (1997);
Stephen J. Ware, Employment Arbitration and Voluntary Consent, 25 HOFSTRA L. REV.
83, 90-94 (1996). For discussions of labor arbitration, see FRANK ELKOURI & EDNA
ASPER ELKOURI, How ARBITRATION WORKS (Marlin M. Volz & Edward P. Goggin eds.,
5th ed. 1997); DENNIS R. NOLAN, LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION IN A
NUTSHELL (1998).
12 Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 121 S. Ct. 1302 (2001); see generally
RICHARD A. BALES, COMPULSORY ARBITRATION: THE GRAND EXPERIMENT IN
EMPLOYMENT 17 (1997).
13 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1994 & Supp. 2000).
14 H.R. REP. No. 68-96, at 2 (1924).
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"motivated, first and foremost, by a congressional desire to enforce
agreements into which parties had entered." 15
A plaintiff, who sues despite an arbitration agreement with the
defendant, is in breach of that agreement. That agreement will be enforced, if
the defendant so requests, by a stay of the plaintiff's lawsuit. 16 By staying
the litigation, a court effectively orders the plaintiff to perform the
agreement to arbitrate. If the plaintiff is to receive any remedy, the plaintiff
will have to pursue it in arbitration, rather than litigation. The only way for
the plaintiff to litigate, rather than arbitrate, is to show that a ground "for the
revocation of any contract" applies to the arbitration agreement. 17 In other
words, the plaintiff must prove a contract-law defense such as
misrepresentation, duress, or unconscionability. 18 In sum, the FAA embodies
a contractual approach to arbitration law. Successful challenges to
arbitration must find their basis in contract law, not some other source of
law.19
The FAA's contractual approach applies to employees' agreements to
arbitrate, just as it applies to any other party's agreement to arbitrate.20 And
it applies regardless of the substantive law claims (causes of action)
involved.21 Thus, an employee's statutory discrimination claim, for example,
will be sent to arbitration rather than litigation, 22 unless the employee can
15 Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs., 489 U.S. 468, 474 (1989) (quoting Dean
Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 220 (1985)).
16 9 U.S.C. § 3 (1994 & Supp. 2000).
17 9 U.S.C. § 2.
18 MACNEIL ET AL., supra note 11, at § 19. The application of these defenses to
arbitration is complicated by the separability doctrine. Id. at § 15; Ware, supra note 11, at
128-38.
19 Stephen J. Ware, Arbitration and Unconscionability after Doctor's Associates,
Inc. v. Casarotto, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 1001, 1002-06 (1996); see also Stephen J.
Ware, Consumer Arbitration as Exceptional Consumer Law, 29 MCGEORGE L. REv. 195,
195 (1998) (defending the contractual approach).
20 Transportation workers, however, are exempted from the FAA. Circuit City
Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 121 S. Ct. 1302 (2001); see also 9 U.S.C. § 1 (1994 & Supp.
2000) ("nothing herein contained shall apply to contracts of employment of seamen,
railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate
commerce.").
21 MACNEIL ET AL., supra note 11, at § 16; STEPHEN J. WARE, ALTERNATIVE
DISPUTE RESOLUTION §§ 2.27 & 2.28 (2001).
22 Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 20 (1991); see also
MACNEIL ET AL., supra note 11, at § 16.5; WARE, supra note 21, at § 2.28 & n.314.
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prove a contract-law ground for challenging the arbitration agreement. The
basic rule of employment arbitration law then, is that employees' arbitration
agreements are enforced according to the standards of ordinary contract law.
Because this rule is embodied in Gilmer and lower court cases applying and
extending it, this article refers to it as the "Gilmer rule."23
The Gilmer rule is very controversial. Gilmer opponents generally take
one of two positions. The more extreme Gilmer opponents would make
employees' pre-dispute arbitration agreements unenforceable.24 The more
moderate Gilmer opponents would make such agreements unenforceable
unless the arbitration contains procedures not typically found in arbitration
outside the employment context.25 Both the extreme and the moderate
23 See supra note 22. The Supreme Court's majority opinion in Gilmer maintained
that Gilmer was technically not an employment case. 500 U.S. at 25 n.2. Gilmer enforced
an employee's agreement to arbitrate age discrimination claims. Id. at 35. The parties to
the arbitration agreement, however, were not the employee and employer. Id. at 25 n.2.
Rather the parties were the employee and various securities exchanges. The employer
was a member of the securities exchanges and, as a condition of membership, was
required by the exchanges to hire for certain jobs only employees who signed the
exchanges' arbitration agreement covering disputes between the employee and employer.
In effect, then, an agreement to arbitrate was a condition of employment.
24 While this position is "extreme" in giving as little weight as possible to employee
consent, this position is not "extreme" in the sense of having few advocates. Many
thoughtful scholars hold this position. See, e.g., Paul D. Carrington & Paul Haagen,
Contract and Jurisdiction, 1996 Sup. CT. REV. 331; Sarah Rudolph Cole, Incentives and
Arbitration: The Case Against Enforcement of Executory Arbitration Agreements
Between Employers and Employees, 64 UMKC L. REV. 449 (1996); Katherine Van
Wezel Stone, Mandatory Arbitration of Individual Employment Rights: The Yellow Dog
Contract of the 1990s, 73 DENv. U. L. REV. 1017 (1996). Cf Jean Stemlight, Panacea or
Corporate Tool?: Debunking the Supreme Court's Preference for Binding Arbitration,
74 WASH. U. L.Q. 637, 642-43 (1996) ("[i]t is critical to distinguish between
commercial arbitration voluntarily agreed to by parties of approximately equal bargaining
power, and commercial arbitration forced upon unknowing consumers, franchisees,
employees or others through the use of form contracts.").
Others who oppose enforcement of employee's pre-dispute arbitration agreements
include the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission and the National Labor
Relations Board.
25 The leading case in this regard is Cole v. Burns International Security Services,
105 F.3d 1465 (D.C. Cir. 1997). Cole did enforce an employee's agreement to arbitrate
statutory employment discrimination claims, but only because
the arbitration arrangement (I) provides for neutral arbitrators, (2) provides for more
than minimal discovery, (3) requires a written award, (4) provides for all of the types
of relief that would otherwise be available in court, and (5) does not require
employees to pay either unreasonable costs or any arbitrators' fees or expenses as a
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Gilmer opponents oppose the contractual approach to employment
arbitration embodied in Gilmer. Therefore, this article will make no further
distinctions between extreme and moderate alternatives to the'Gilmer rule,
and will focus on the arguments for and against the Gilmer rule itself.
The controversy surrounding the Gilmer rule has focused on the
arbitration of statutory discrimination claims.26 There are other claims sent
to arbitration under the Gilmer rule. These include common law claims and
statutory claims involving financial matters, rather than discrimination.27 But
sending these claims to arbitration has not been nearly as controversial as
sending discrimination claims to arbitration. The participants in the
employment arbitration debate seem to be most passionate about, and have
the most at stake in, the arbitration of statutory discrimination claims in
particular. Thus an analysis of employment arbitration law must include an
analysis of employment discrimination statutes.
IH. EFFECTS OF AN EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION STATUTE
A. Introduction
The most important employment discrimination statutes include Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), 28 the Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA),29 and the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967.30 Much of the literature on the effects of these
statutes is well summarized and synthesized by Christine Jolls in her recent
article, Accommodation Mandates.31 This section (Section II) briefly
condition of access to the arbitration forum.
Id. at 1482. Numbers 2 and 5 are the innovations here, because numbers 1, 3, and 4 are
generally found in commercial arbitration.
26 Green, supra note 8, at 407 n.25, 410 n.30 (citing commentators); Ware, supra
note 11, at 101 n.92.
27 See, e.g., Montes v. Shearson Lehman Bros., 128 F.3d 1456, 1457 (11th Cir.
1997) (arbitration of claim for overtime pay under Fair Labor Standards Act).
28 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-e17 (1994 & Supp. 2000).
29 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12102, 12201-12213 (1994 & Supp. 2000).
30 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (1994 & Supp. III 1997, Supp. IV 1998).
31 Christine Jolls, Accommodation Mandates, 53 STAN. L. REv. 223 (2000)
[hereinafter Jolls, Accommodation Mandates]. A modified version of this article is
available online. Christine Jolls, Accommodation Mandates and Antidiscrimination Law,
at http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olincenter/papers/pdf/286.pdf (last visited
April 11, 2001) [hereinafter Jolls, Online Accommodation Mandates]; see also Christine
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summarizes the framework constructed by Jolls. Section IV of this article
extends Jolls's framework to employment arbitration.
B. Universal Employment Mandates
Consider first a statute requiring all employers to provide a certain
benefit to all employees. Social Security can serve as an example of this sort
of mandated benefit because nearly all employers in the Uiited States are
subject to a Social Security payroll tax. This mandate, in the standard
economic model, causes wages to fall because the mandated benefit
increases the supply of labor at any given wage and decreases the demand
for labor at any given wage.32 Much of the cost of this mandated benefit is,
in the economic model, paid for by employees in the form of lower wages.33
Not all of the cost of the mandated benefit is necessarily paid for by
employees, however. Some of the cost may be paid for by employers, in the
form of lower profits, and by consumers, in the form of higher prices. 34 The
extent to which the cost is borne by (1) employees, (2) employers, and
(3) consumers is determined by the elasticity of supply and demand in the
ultimate product markets and in the markets for the factors of production,
labor and capital. 35
For most employers, labor and capital are, to some extent, substitutes for
each other. Therefore, increases in the cost of labor typically cause
employers to use less labor and more capital.3 6 This shift from labor to
capital causes employers' total production costs to rise (except in the rare
case when labor and capital are perfect substitutes for each other).37 These
Jolls, Antidiscrimination and Accommodation (2001) (unpublished manuscript, on file
with author) [hereinafter Jolls, Antidiscrimination]; Christine Jolls, Hands-Tying and the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1813 (1996).
32 Lawrence H. Summers, Some Simple Economics of Mandated Benefits, 79 AM.
ECON. REV. 177 (1989). The term "wage" as used in this article includes the value of
non-wage compensation as well.
33 Jolls, Accommodation Mandites, supra note 31, at 233-40.
34 Id. at 239.
35 RANDALL K. FILER ET AL., THE ECONOMICs OF WORK-AND PAY 226-28 (6th ed.
1996).
36 E.g., id at 150-58; DANIEL S. HAMERMESH & ALBERT REF_, THE ECONOMICS OF
WORK AND PAY 99-102 (3d ed. 1984); see generally JAMES D. GWARTNEY & RICHARD
L. STROUP, ECONOMICS: PRIVATE AND PUBLIC CHOICE 655-63 (7th ed. 1995).
37 HAMERMESH & REES, supra note 36, at 110 ("The impact of the wage increase on
costs per unit of output will be minimized by substitution in production, but this will not
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higher production costs are, in competitive product markets, completely
passed along to consumers.38 In non-competitive product markets, i.e., those
in which firms (employers) are earning economic profits, only some of the
higher production costs are passed along to consumers, with the rest
absorbed by employers in the form of lower profits. 39
With respect to universal employment mandates like Social Security,
available empirical data confirms the economic model's prediction that
much, but not all, of the mandate's cost is paid by employees in the form of
lower wages.40
C. Targeted Employment Mandates
1. Generally
In contrast to universal employment mandates like Social Security, other
statutory employment mandates are targeted to certain employees. These
statutes are, as Christine Jolls puts it, "directed to discrete groups of
workers, such as the disabled, [and] are intended to accommodate the unique
needs of those workers. '41 As an example of such a statute, the following
pages use the ADA, but the reasoning also applies to Title VII and other
employment discrimination statutes.42
ordinarily prevent some rise in unit costs.").
38 FILER Er AL., supra note 35, at 226 ("Of course, if the industry is competitive,
profits before and after the [social security] tax must be zero, and the true division is
between the portion of the tax born by the worker and the portion born by the consumer
through higher prices."); HAMERMESH & REEs, supra note 36, at 110 ("In a competitive
industry in the long run all firms are earning zero economic profits (just covering the
opportunity cost of all inputs). Thus none of the increase in total unit costs can be
absorbed by profits; it will all be passed on product prices.").
39 FILER El AL., supra note 35, at 226-28; HAMERMESH & REES, supra note 36, at
110.
40 See FILER ET AL, supra note 35, at 227 n.4; Patricia M. Anderson & Bruce D.
Meyer, The Effects of Firm Specific Taxes and Government Mandates with an
Application to the U.S. Unemployment Insurance Program, 65 J. PUB. EcoN. 119, 120
(1997); Jonathan Gruber & Alan B. Krueger, The Incidence of Mandated Employer-
Provided Insurance: Lessons from Workers Compensation Insurance, TAX POL'Y &
ECON. (1991).
41 Jolls, Online Accommodation Mandates, supra note 31, at 1.
42 Some see the ADA as significantly different from other employment
discrimination statutes (like Title VII) because the ADA contains both an accommodation
mandate and an anti-discrimination provision, while other statutes contain only an anti-
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The ADA creates a protected class of individuals who have an
"impairment that substantially limits one or more.., major life activities,"
have a record of such an impairment, or are regarded as having such an
impairment.43 The ADA protects this class of disabled individuals through
an accommodation mandate, 4 and a set of anti-discrimination provisions.45
One might expect that protected-class employees pay (in the form of
lower wages) for the ADA, just as all employees pay (in the form of lower
wages) for Social Security.46 There are, however, two important differences
between targeted mandates, like the ADA, and universal mandates, like
Social Security. The first important difference is simply that targeted
mandates are targeted. These mandates directly affect the supply of, and
demand for, labor of protected-class employees only, not all employees as in
the case of a universal mandate.47 The second important difference is that
targeted mandates are accompanied by legal prohibitions on discrimination.
These anti-discrimination provisions prohibit employers from paying less to
discrimination provision, without any accommodation mandate. See, e.g., Pamela S.
Karlan & George Rutherglen, Disabilities, Discrimination, and Reasonable
Accommodation, 46 DUKE L.J. 1, 2-3, 8-9 (1996).
Jolls provides important "reasons for viewing accommodation mandates as similar
to, rather than fundamentally distinct from, antidiscrimination law." Jolls, Online
Accommodation Mandates, supra note 31, at 71. Both accommodation mandates and
anti-discrimination provisions: (1) increase the willingness of protected-class employees
to supply labor at any given wage, and (2) increase the employer's costs of employing
protected-class employees. Id. at 16-24, 72-73. Like accommodation mandates, anti-
discrimination provisions impose on the employer "real financial costs associated with a
particular group of workers." Id. at 7. One of these costs is the risk of a suit for every
adverse outcome (not just every termination) suffered by a protected-class employee. Id.
at 19-21. Furthermore, anti-discrimination provisions themselves impose accommodation
mandates under "disparate-impact" caselaw. Id. at 21-24, 76-77. These points are
developed in Jolls, Antidiscrimination, supra note 31.
To reiterate, both accommodation mandates and anti-discrimination provisions
increase the employer's costs of employing protected-class employees. That point is the
basis for this article's reasoning about how those costs may be passed on to consumers
and non-protected-class employees and how those costs may be reduced by arbitration,
i.e., the Gilmer rule. In sum, this article's reasoning applies to anti-discrimination
provisions as it applies to accommodation mandates because both increase the
employer's costs of employing protected-class employees.
43 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (1994 & Supp. 2000).
44 See id. §§ 12112(a), (b)(5).
45 See id. §§ 12112(a), (b)(1)-(4), (6), (7).
4 6 See Jolls, Accommodation Mandates, supra note 31, at 280.
47Id at 240.
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protected-class employees or refusing to hire or retain protected-class
employees. 48 These prohibitions, if enforced sufficiently to be binding on
employers, prevent the drop in protected-class wages or employment levels
that would otherwise be caused by the targeted mandate.
2. Binding and Non-Binding Anti-Discrimination Provisions
If anti-discrimination prohibitions are enforced sufficiently to bind
employers, Le., employers cannot lower the wages or employment levels of
protected-class employees, then all employees pay (in the form of lower
wages) for the targeted mandate.49 In other words, the targeted employment
mandate confers financial benefits only on protected-class employees, but
the cost of this mandate is spread among all employees in and out of the
protected class.50
As discussed above, not all the cost of the mandate is necessarily paid
for by employees.51 Some of the cost may be paid for by employers, in the
form of lower profits, and by consumers, in the form of higher prices. 52 But
to the extent the cost of a targeted mandate is paid for by employees, it is
paid for by all employees-both those in the protected class and those out of
it. In short, targeted employment mandates redistribute from employees
outside the protected class to those in the protected class. 53
This redistribution does not occur, however, if anti-discrimination
prohibitions fail to bind employers, i.e., if employers can lower the wages or
48 Id. at 241.
4 9 Id. at 264-65.
50 Notice that this article's implicit baseline is the absence of the employment
statute. Starting with that baseline leads one to see the statute as conferring "benefits" on
protected-class employees. An alternative baseline would see the absence of the statute as
conferring benefits on non-protected-class employees. Under this alternative baseline, the
statute might be seen, not as conferring benefits on protected-class employees, but as
removing the benefit previously held by non-protected-class employees.
This article uses the baseline that sees the statutes as conferring "benefits" because
(1) this is common usage, at least with respect to Social Security and workers'
compensation and other universal employment "benefits," and (2) Jolls uses that
baseline. Jolls, Accommodation Mandates, supra note 31, at 225 (using the word
"benefits" to describe workers' compensation and family leave).
51 See supra notes 32-40 and accompanying text.
52 See id.; Jolls, Accommodation Mandates, supra note 31, at 239.
53 Jolls, Accommodation Mandates, supra note 31, at 248.
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emplbyment levels of protected-class employees. 54 In this situation only
protected-class employees pay (in the form of lower wages or employment
levels) for the targeted mandate. Jolls provides extensive analysis, and
reviews empirical evidence, indicating the extent to which anti-
discrimination provisions bind employers in the contexts of race, sex, and
disability. 55 She concludes that the extent to which anti-discrimination
provisions bind employers varies with the context.56 In other words, the
degree to which targeted employment mandates redistribution from non-
protected-class employees to protected-class employees varies with the
context.
3. Conclusion
As just noted, targeted employment mandates are, in varying degrees,
paid for by people other than pr6tected-class employees. It is worth
recapping how this occurs. Initially, the cost of targeted. mandates is borne
by the employer because the costs of having certain employees rise.57 These
costs may be borne entirely by employers (in the form of lower profits) or
they may be passed onto consumers (in the form of higher prices) or to
employees outside the protected class (in the form of lower wages).58
Whether any of these pass-ons occur depends-on the supply and demand in
54 Id. at 255-63.
55 Studies tend to indicate that the ADA reduces the employment levels of
protected-class employees, id at 276-78, and this is consistent with Jolls' view that
"there are unlikely to be binding restrictions on employment differentials between
disabled and nondisabled workers." Id. at 275 (emphasis in original). Studies also tend to
indicate that employment mandates targeted to women employees tend to reduce the
wages of women employees, id. at 286-88, 290-96, and this is consistent with Jolls'
view that there is "substantial occupational segregation by sex" in employment markets,
id at 283, and such segregation generally makes prohibitions on sex-based wage
differentials non-binding. Jolls, Online Accommodation Mandates, supra note 31, at 45-
48. Finally, studies tend to indicate that, in the context of race, Title VII raises both the
wages and employment levels of protected-class employees, id. at 71, and this is
consistent with Jolls' view that prohibitions on wage and employment-level
discrimination are more likely to be binding in the context of race, than in the contexts of
sex and disability. Id. at 69. These points are developed in Jolls, Antidiscrimination,
supra note 31.
56 See supra note 55.
57 See supra text accompanying note 54.
58 See supra text accompanying note 55-57.
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the relevant markets for labor, for capital, and for whatever goods this
workplace produces. 59
IV. EFFECTS OF EMPLOYMENT ARBITRATION
A. Introduction
The previous section of this article summarized Christine Jolls'
framework for analyzing the effects of employment discrimination statutes.
This section extends that framework to employment arbitration to describe
the effects of the Gilmer rule. Recall that the Gilmer rule makes an
employee's agreement to arbitrate enforceable "save upon such grounds as
exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract. ' 60 The Gilmer
rule permits employers to make an employee's agreement to arbitrate a
condition of employment. Employers can tell employees "sign this or you're
fired," and can tell prospective employees "sign this or you don't get the
job." An employee's agreement to arbitrate under these circumstances is
generally enforceable under the Gilmer rule.61
Who benefits from the enforcement of these agreements? Apparently,
the employers that use them benefit. Otherwise, why would these employers
insist on arbitration agreements with their employees? It is possible, of
course, that these employers are acting against their own interests by using
arbitration agreements.62 Similarly, it is possible that employers that choose
59 See supra text accompanying notes 36-39.
60 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1994 & Supp. 2000).
61 See Ware, supra note 11, at 120-38. This leads Gilmer opponents to characterize
much employment arbitration as "imposed" or "forced" upon employees by employers.
See, e.g., Jean R. Stemlight, Mandatory Binding Arbitration and the Demise of the
Seventh Amendment Right to a Jury Trial, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DIsP. RESOL. 669 (2001). It
leads Gilmer opponents to reject the idea that employees have "agreed" or "consented" to
arbitration. See, e.g., Miriam A. Cherry, Note, Not-So-Arbitrary Arbitration: Using Title
VII Disparate Impact Analysis to Invalidate Employment Contracts that Discriminate, 21
HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 267, 269 n.9 (1998). The concepts of consent and coercion are
important, complex, and rhetorically powerful. For these reasons, scholars using these
concepts should carefully define their terms. See, e.g., Ware, supra note 11, at 108-13
(defining terms); see also id. at 103-38 (arguing that only one change in the law, repeal
of the separability doctrine, is needed to ensure that employment arbitration is voluntary
and consensual).
62 The thesis of one article is that "mandatory arbitration is a disadvantage for large
employers in terms of overall costs and outcomes when compared to the courts." Green,
supra note 8, at 401 n.; see also Cherry, supra note 61, at 269 n.10.
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not to use these agreements are acting against their own interests. Given the
variety of employers and their situations, it seems likely that insisting on
arbitration agreements is in the interests of some employers, but not others.
This article will assume that those employers that insist on arbitration
agreements as a condition of employment are doing so because those
employers benefit from those agreements. 63
Consider the possible sources of these benefits to the employer. One
possible source is that comparable cases lead to lower awards in arbitration
than in litigation.64 These lower expectations would then be reflected in
lower settlements,65 and in fewer cases being brought in the first place.66 All
of this would reduce payments by employers. There would be fewer cases in
which they pay at all, and of those cases that are brought, employers would
(on average) pay less in both those cases resolved by adjudication and those
resolved by settlement.
A second possible source of arbitration's benefits to the employer is that
even if the amount of awards is identical in arbitration and litigation, the
employer's cost of getting to the award is lower in arbitration. In other
words, the employer's process costs are generally lower in arbitration than in
litigation. The employer's process costs include the time and legal fees spent
on pleadings, discovery, motions, trial or hearing, and appeal. If these costs
are lower in arbitration than in litigation then arbitration benefits employers
63 Testing this assumption would require a researcher to obtain from employers
ordinarily confidential data about their experiences before and after adopting arbitration.
That would include data about all employee disputes and their resolution, including the
amounts of any settlement payments and the time and other resources spent resolving all
employment disputes whether or not a claim was asserted in arbitration or litigation.
Even with this data, a researcher still would not know whether any change in the
employer's experience was caused by adoption of arbitration or by unrelated factors that
changed around the same time. See BALES, supra note 12, at 102-14, for a summary of
one employer's experience.
64 This might occur for any number of reasons. For example, arbitration's rules
regarding evidence and discovery may be more favorable to employers than litigation's
rules on those matters, or arbitrators may tend to attach a lower dollar amount to
employee's injuries than jurors do.
65This is the alternative dispute resolution (ADR) axiom that settlement
negotiations occur in "the shadow of the law." See Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis
Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J.
950, 968 (1979) ("the outcome that the law will impose if no agreement is reached gives
each [party] certain bargaining chips-an endowment of sorts.").
66 Lower expected awards, all else being equal, make plaintiffs (and plaintiffs'
lawyers on contingency fees) less likely to bring claims at all.
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even if the results (damages and other remedies) of arbitration are identical
to those of litigation.67
B. Lower Awards
Consider first the effects of the Gilmer rule if all arbitration's benefits to
the employer come from lower awards than in litigation. This is plainly a
cost to protected-class employees because they win less on their claims, and
that will be reflected in the settlement value of their claims and in the
deterrent effect of encouraging compliance with the law. 68 Conversely, the
employer benefits from all this because the employer pays less. But some of
those benefits may be passed onto consumers or to employees. That will
depend on the supply and demand in the relevant markets for labor, capital,
and whatever goods the workplace produces. 69
The analysis in the previous paragraph is the flip side of the analysis (in
the previous section) of the effects of an employment discrimination
statute. 70 That is because if arbitration benefits the employer solely by
reducing awards in comparable cases then arbitration has the opposite effect
of the statute creating the targeted employment mandate. Arbitration undoes,
to some extent, the effects of the employment discrimination statute if
arbitration benefits the employer solely by reducing awards in comparable
cases.
C. Lower Process Costs
Now consider the effects of the Gilmer rule if all arbitration's benefits to
the employer come from lower process costs. In other words, assume that
67 There may be other possible sources of arbitration's benefits to the employer,
(e.g., confidentiality) but they seem small enough to justify the working assumption that
these two benefits (lower awards and lower process costs) are the only possible benefits.
In other words, the assumption underlying the rest of this article is that employers who
insist on arbitration as a condition of employment benefit from (1) lower awards than in
litigation, (2) lower process costs than in litigation, or (3) a combination of the other two.
The economics of employment arbitration agreements is also discussed in Keith N.
Hylton, Agreements to Waive or to Arbitrate Legal Claims: An Economic Analysis, 8
SUP. CT. EcON. REv. 209 (2000) and Keith N. Hylton, The Lmv and Economics of
Agreements to Arbitrate Employment Claims (forthcoming).
68 See supra text accompanying note 55.
69 See supra text accompanying note 61.
70 See supra Part III.C.
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comparable cases get the same award or the same result in arbitration as in
litigation but the employer's costs of getting to that result are lower in
arbitration. These lower process costs benefit the employer. And some of
these benefits may be passed on to consumers or to employees. 71 In other
words, the employer's lower process costs benefit some or all parties while
harming no one, except those (like lawyers) who sell process.72
To see this point another way, imagine that, instead of paying lawyers to
litigate employment-discrimination cases, the employer could wave a magic
wand that would generate exactly the results of litigation but at zero cost in
lawyers' fees. This magic wand would benefit (or at least not harm) every
non-lawyer, including protected-class employees. If all arbitration's benefits
to the employer come from lower lawyers' fees then arbitration differs from
the magic wand only insofar as arbitration merely lowers employers'
lawyers' fees, while the magic wand eliminates them entirely.73
71 Whether such pass-ons occur will depend on the factors mentioned earlier. See
supra notes 35-36.
72 The analysis in the text deals only with the employer's process costs, such as the
employer's lawyer's fees. The employee's process costs, including the employee's
lawyer's fees, can be analyzed separately. In employment-discrimination cases, the
employee typically hires a lawyer on a contingency-fee basis and prevailing plaintiffs
generally have the right to have their lawyer's fees paid by the defendant. See ROTHSTEIN
ET AL., supra note 10, at § 2.32 ("The ordinary procedure for the computation of
attorneys' fees is the calculation of the lodestar. The lodestar is the amount representing
the multiplication of the number of hours spent on the case times the hourly rate."); see,
e.g., Venegas v. Mitchell, 495 U.S. 82, 84 (1990).
To the extent the employee's lawyer's fees are paid by the employer, then those fees
can be analyzed much like the employer's lawyer's fees are analyzed in the text. (To the
extent arbitration reduces lawyer's fees, the only harm is to lawyers.) There is, however, a
wrinkle. If awards in arbitration are the same as in litigation, but employees' lawyer's
fees are lower in arbitration (because fewer lawyer-hours are required) then arbitration
may be less attractive than litigation to employees' lawyers. Whether fewer lawyer-hours
per case are attractive to employees' lawyers depends on the contingent fee percentage,
the probability of winning, and alternative uses for the employee's lawyer's time. If this
factor makes arbitration less attractive to employees' lawyers, then this harms employees
by reducing the supply of lawyers willing to bring these cases.
73 The foregoing analysis of lawyers' fees applies equally to other process costs,
such as the costs of expert witnesses, court reporters and stenographers, or travel to
depositions.
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D. Conclusion
This section has shown that the source of employment arbitration's
benefit to the employer matters. If the only source is lower awards in
comparable cases then the Gilmer rule undoes, to some extent, the effects of
the employment discrimination statute. While this benefits employers and,
perhaps, consumers and employees outside the protected class, it harms
protected-class employees. 74 In contrast, if the only source of employment
arbitration's benefit to the employer is lower process costs then the Gilmer
rule benefits some or all parties and harms no one, except those (like
lawyers) who sell process.
The foregoing analysis reveals the theories behind the rhetoric of each
side in the employment arbitration debate. When opponents of the Gilmer
rule accuse that rule of undercutting employment-discrimination statutes,
they are espousing the theory that employment arbitration benefits
employers by lowering awards. When proponents of the Gilmer rule praise
that rule as helping everyone but lawyers, they are espousing the theory that
employment arbitration benefits employers by lowering process costs. Both
theories are plausible. And it may well be that both theories are, to some
extent, correct because arbitration both lowers awards in comparable cases
and lowers process costs in comparable cases.
V. EMPIRICAL STUDIES
A. Introduction
Some empirical studies of employment arbitration address the relative
levels of awards and process costs in arbitration and litigation. These studies
may be somewhat probative in determining which of the two aforementioned
theories is correct. That is, these studies may be somewhat probative in
determining: (1) whether Gilmer opponents are correct that arbitration
74 See Cherry, supra note 61, at 298.
Allowing employers to require waivers of antidiscrimination litigation rights as a
condition of employment [i.e., enforcing employees' arbitration agreements,]
undermines the purposes of Title VII by creating a disproportionate effect on
potential victims of discrimination-women and people of color. Despite its facial
neutrality, an employer's imposition of a pre-dispute mandatory arbitration contract
constitutes a special deterrent for women and people of color from accepting a
position in that workplace.
Id.
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lowers awards in comparable cases, and (2) whether Gilmer proponents are
correct that arbitration lowers process costs in comparable cases. These
studies, however, are not conclusive and should be cited with care.
B. The Repeat-Player Effect and Those Who Make Too Much oflt
The best known studies of employment arbitration, by Lisa Bingham,
devote little attention to the relative levels of awards and process costs in
arbitration and litigation.75 Instead, Bingham emphasizes her finding that
employers who are repeat-players at arbitration do better in arbitration than
employers who arbitrate only once.76 Some Gilmer opponents cite this
"repeat player bias" to impugn the neutrality of "arbitrators who depend for
their livelihood on repeat business."77 Gilmer opponents also theorize that
the repeat-player effect may be caused by repeat-players' advantage in
75 Bingham studied employment arbitration administered by the American
Arbitration Association in the early 1990s. See generally Lisa B. Bingham, On Repeat
Players, Adhesive Contracts, and the Use of Statistics in Judicial Review of Employment
Arbitration Awards, 29 MCGEORGE L. REV. 223 (1998) [hereinafter Bingham, On Repeat
Players] (studying 1993-1995 arbitrations); Lisa B. Bingham, Employment Arbitration:
The Repeat Player Effect, 1 EMP. RTs. & EMP. POL'Y J. 189 (1997) [hereinafter
Bingham, The Repeat Player Effect] (studying 1993-1994 arbitrations); Lisa B.
Bingham, Emerging Due Process Concerns in Employment Arbitration: A Look at Actual
Cases, 47 LAB. L.J. 108 (1996) [hereinafter Bingham, Emerging Due Process Concerns]
(studying 1993 arbitrations); Lisa B. Bingham, Is There a Bias in Arbitration of
Nonunion Employment Disputes? An Analysis of Actual Cases and Outcomes, 6 INT'L J.
CONFLICT MGMT. 369 (1995) (studying 1992 arbitrations).
76 Bingham, On Repeat Players, supra note 75, at 238-39; Bingham, The Repeat
Player Effect, supra note 75, at 205-10; Bingham, Emerging Due Process Concerns,
supra note 75, at 115.
77 Letter from John Vail, American Trial Lawyers Association, to the United States
Department of Commerce and Federal Trade Commission 4 (Mar. 21, 2000), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/altdisresolution/comments/vail.pdf; see also Cherry, supra note
61, at 269 n.8 ("[A]rbitration companies, for the sake of their own profit margins, may
abandon fair procedural protections and instead cater to the employers who have hired
them to perform a service."). Sarah Rudolph Cole makes a slightly different, but related,
point:
Economic coercion clearly plays some role in a system where an arbitrator who
regularly finds in favor of complaining employees may expect that the employer will
be reluctant to rehire him in the future. This perverse incentive does not exist in
commercial or labor arbitration because both parties are repeat players.
Cole, supra note 24, at 478-79.
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compiling information about potential arbitrators and their prior rulings. 78
To the extent arbitrator selection is a function of party choice, 79 a party has
an incentive to choose arbitrators likely to rule in its favor and the repeat-
player's better information makes it more likely to succeed in predicting
arbitrators' rulings. 80
Bingham points out, though, that "[r]epeat player employers generally
get to arbitration based on an arbitration clause in a personnel manual or
employee handbook," as opposed to an individualized employment
contract. 81 As employers more frequently win cases stemming from a
manual or handbook, Bingham "suggests that the repeat player effect may
itself be a product of other factors, including the underlying agreement to
arbitrate as reflected in a personnel manual, rather than an individually
negotiated contract."'82 It may well be that employees who lack individually-
negotiated contracts assert claims that tend to be weaker on the merits than
claims asserted by employees who have individually-negotiated contracts. 83
In other words, the data may be caused, not by arbitrators favoring their
paymasters or by repeat-players' greater ability to predict arbitrators'
rulings, but by the weakness of claims asserted by employees who lack
individually negotiated contracts.
The previous paragraph shows that, even if the Bingham studies reveal a
repeat-player effect in arbitration, they do not reveal whether that effect is
present when one controls for the merits of the cases. In other words, the
presence of a repeat-player may make no difference in otherwise comparable
cases. So the empirical evidence on a repeat-player effect is inconclusive.
The most important point about the repeat-player effect, however, is that
this effect may be at least as prevalent in litigation as in arbitration. 84 It is
78 Cole, supra note 24, at 476-79.
79 It may be indirect party choice because some arbitration rules provide that the
arbitration organization, rather than the parties, selects the arbitrators.
80 Bingham, On Repeat Players, supra note 75, at 240.
81 Id. at 238.
82 Id. at 239.
83 Cf Bingham, The Repeat Player Effect, supra note 75, at 213. This is plausible if
individually-negotiated contracts (which tend to be achieved only by high-level
employees) tend to confer more rights on employees than personnel manuals (which tend
to be take-it-or-leave-it documents distributed to a wide range of employees). As
Bingham points out, "Personnel manuals are more likely to be the product of a repeat
player employer unilaterally structuring the employment relationship and dismissal
transaction to its best advantage." Id.
84 Research revealed no published studies addressing this. If the repeat-player effect
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the comparison of arbitration and litigation that matters for an assessment of
the Gilmer rule. And the many pages written about repeat players say little
about this comparison. In particular, they say little about the relative levels
of awards and process costs in comparable cases in arbitration and litigation.
C. Studies Comparing Employment Arbitration and Litigation
There are two well-known studies comparing employment arbitration
with employment litigation. One study is by William Howard 85 and the other
is by Lewis Maltby.86 Both find that employees win a much higher
percentage of their claims in arbitration than in litigation. 87 While Gilmer
proponents cite these findings as proof that arbitration is better than
litigation for employees,88 Howard and Maltby recognize that one must
consider not only how often employees win, but also how much they win.89
in arbitration is caused by differences in the merits between personnel manual cases and
individual-contract cases, see supra note 83, then one would hope and expect to find a
repeat-player effect in litigation, too.
85 William M. Howard, Mandatory Arbitration of Employment Discrimination
Disputes 62, 100 (1995) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Arizona State University) (on
file with author) (Howard studied American Arbitration Association employment
arbitration from 1993 and 1994, securities Self-Regulatory Organization arbitration from
February 1992 to October 1994, and employment litigation from June 1, 1992 to May 31,
1994); see also William M. Howard, Arbitrating Claims of Employment Discrimination,
DIsP. RESOL. J., Oct.-Dec. 1995, at 40.
86 Lewis L. Maltby, Private Justice: Employment Arbitration and Civil Rights, 30
COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REV. 29, 47-49 (1998) [hereinafter Maltby, Employment
Arbitration and Civil Rights] (comparing 1994 employment litigation data with
Bingham's employment arbitration data from the same year and with Bingham's 1993-
1995 employment-arbitration data); see also Lewis Maltby, Employment Arbitration: Is It
Really Second Class Justice?, DIsP. RESOL. MAG., Fall 1999, at 23.
87 Maltby finds that employees win 63% of their claims in arbitration and only 15%
of their claims in litigation. Maltby, Employment Arbitration and Civil Rights, supra note
86, at 46. And Maltby cites other studies also finding that employees win a high
percentage of their claims in arbitration. Id. at 49-50. Howard finds that employees win
68% of their claims in arbitration, Howard, Mandatory Arbitration of Employment
Discrimination Disputes, supra note 85, at 124, and only 28% of their claims in
litigation. Id. at 107.
8 8 See, e.g., JAMES T. RILEY, CITIZENS FOR A SOUND ECON., PROTECTING THE TRIAL
LAWYER MONOPOLY: THE ASSAULT ON STATE AND FEDERAL BINDING ARBITRATION,
ISSUE ANALYSIS 106, at 2 (July 12, 2000), available at
http://www.cse.orglinformed/866.html.
89 Howard, Mandatory Arbitration of Employment Discrimination Disputes, supra
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Howard and Maltby both find that employees who win in litigation win
substantially more money than employees who win in arbitration. 90
Both Howard and Maltby also address the process costs of arbitration
and litigation. Both conclude that process costs of arbitration are much
lower.91 This conclusion supports Gilmer proponents who argue that the
Gilmer rule benefits some or all parties while harming no one, except those
(like lawyers) who sell process. 92 The Maltby study further supports this
position by combining data on arbitration's higher employee-win rates and
lower awards to calculate that employees have a higher adjusted outcome in
arbitration than litigation. 93 On the other hand, Howard's data, which shows
note 85, at 127; Maltby, Employment Arbitration and Civil Rights, supra note 86, at 48.
90 Howard finds that both mean and median awards are at least three times higher in
litigation than in arbitration. Howard, Mandatory Arbitration of Employment
Discrimination Disputes, supra note 85, at 132. Maltby finds that winning claims in
arbitration recover only 25% of the amount demanded, while winning claims in litigation
recover 70% of the amount demanded. Maltby, Employment Arbitration and Civil Rights,
supra note 86, at 48. A survey of employers who have adopted arbitration systems
revealed that many employers believed that juries posed too great a risk of run-away
monetary awards. See Mei L. Bickner et al., Developments in Employment Arbitration,
DisP. RESOL. J., Jan. 1997, at 8, 78-79.
Because of the time-value of money, a comparison of awards in arbitration and
litigation should adjust for the length of time it takes the winning employee to obtain the
money. Maltby suggests that the average arbitration case is resolved in less than half the
time required for civil litigation. Maltby, Employment Arbitration and Civil Rights, supra
note 86, at 55 (citing Gary G. Mathiason & Pavneet S. Uppal, Evaluating and Using
Employer-Initiated Arbitration Rules and Agreements, in EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
AND CIVIL RIGHTS ACTIONS IN FEDERAL AND STATE COURTS 875, 894 (1994)).
91 Howard surveyed employment lawyers. Lawyers who represent employer-
defendants estimated their clients' cost of lawyers' fees, expenses, and court costs
averaged $96,000 in litigation and only $20,000 in arbitration. Howard, Mandatory
Arbitration of Employment Discrimination Disputes, supra note 85, at 142. The General
Accounting Office also found that legal fees among its employer-respondents were
generally lower in arbitration. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ALTERNATE DISPUTE
RESOLUTION: EMPLOYERS' EXPERIENCES WITH ADR IN THE WORKPLACE 19 (1997).
Maltby suggests that legal fees in arbitration could run as little as $3,000. Lewis L.
Maltby, The Projected Economic Impact of the Model Employment Termination Act, 536
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI., 103, 117 (1994).
92 Gilmer proponents argue that employment arbitration benefits employers by
lowering process costs and some of these benefits may be passed on to consumers and
employees. See supra Part III.C.2 & 3.
93 Maltby, Employment Arbitration and Civil Rights, supra note 86, at 48-49.
The "adjusted outcome" is the total amount received by all plaintiffs in arbitration or
in court-not merely those who were successful-as a percentage of their demands.
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a larger difference between arbitration and litigation awards, might lead to
the opposite conclusion if a similar calculation is performed. 94
D. Warning! Use Empirical Studies with Care!
The Howard and Maltby studies paint a picture of the relative levels of
awards and process costs in arbitration and litigation. And this picture may
be accurate.95 There is, however, an important reason to be skeptical about
its accuracy. Empirical studies can tell us the relative levels of awards and
process costs in arbitration and litigation, but that does not mean they can
tell us the relative levels of awards and process costs in arbitration and
litigation in comparable cases. The probative value we give to empirical
studies should turn on our level of confidence that the studied cases going to
arbitration are comparable to the studied cases going to litigation.96 And, in
reality, nobody knows whether the cases going to arbitration are comparable
This "adjusted outcome" for arbitration-plaintiffs is eighteen percent (i.e., plaintiffs
as a whole in arbitration received eighteen percent of their demands). For plaintiffs
in litigation, the adjusted outcome is only 10.4%.
Id at 48.
94 Howard finds that both mean and median awards are at least three times higher in
litigation than in arbitration. Howard, Mandatory Arbitration of Employment
Discrimination Disputes, supra note 85, at 132.
9S Of course its accuracy may be confined to the particulars of the arbitration
studied. Bingham, Howard, and Maltby studied employment arbitration administered by
the American Arbitration Association and securities Self-Regulatory Organizations. Non-
administered arbitration, or arbitration administered by other organizations, may differ.
Even AAA and SRO arbitration may now differ from that studied by Bingham, Howard,
and Maltby because of recent changes in these organizations' procedures. See Green,
supra note 8, at 424-28; see Lisa B. Bingham, Employment Arbitrations Before and
After the Due Process Protocol: Preliminary Evidence that Self-Regulation Makes A
Difference in Alternative Dispute Resolution in the Employment Arena, in ALTERNATIVE
DIsPUTE RESOLUTION IN THE EMPLOYMENT ARENA: PROCEEDINGS OF NEw YORK
UNIVERSITY'S 53RD ANNUAL CONFERENCE ON LABOR (Samuel Estreicher ed.,
forthcoming 2002).
96 Cf Carrie Menkel-Meadow, When Dispute Resolution Beget Disputes of Its Own:
Conflicts Among Dispute Professionals, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1871, 1924 (1997).
In contrast to the many court-connected [ADR] program evaluations, however,
there is little to no information concerning the private uses of ADR, in large part
because developing anything close to an experimental or comparative design model
is virtually impossible.
Research concerning the effects of ADR programs is especially difficult due to
the problems of developing control groups ....
Id.
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to the cases going to litigation. 97 As Bingham points out, "there is a risk that
on the merits, employment arbitration and litigation cases may be apples and
oranges." 98
In other areas of study, a scholar can (to a great extent) overcome this
methodological problem. Suppose, for example, that a court requires
mediation of all cases with odd docket numbers, but not of cases with even
docket numbers. A scholar could then compare the results of the odd cases to
the results of the even cases and attribute any differences to the rule
requiring mediation. With a sufficiently large sample size, we would be quite
confident that the odd cases are comparable to the even cases. That is
because the odd and even docket numbers are completely unrelated to
anything that might plausibly affect the results of the cases.
In contrast, the selection of cases between arbitration and litigation is
very different. Employment cases go to arbitration when, and only when,
there is an arbitration agreement. The employers who use arbitration
agreements may be systematically different from the employers who do not
use arbitration agreements. It may, for example, be that employers who use
arbitration agreements have better lawyers than employers who do not. Or it
may be the other way around. It may be that employers who use arbitration
agreements have better (or worse) human resource departments than
employers who do not. It may be that employers who use arbitration
agreements are more (or less) likely to have previously defended
employment-discrimination claims.99 It may be that employers who use
arbitration agreements have better (or worse) reputations for their treatment
of employees. It may be that employers who use arbitration agreements are
97 Maltby seems to have recognized this and tried to adjust for it by expressing the
employee's award as a percentage of the amount demanded in the complaint. Maltby,
Employment Arbitration and Civil Rights, supra note 86, at 48-49. But comparative
statistics assessing damages as a percentage of the amount demanded are themselves
suspect. "Given that the fees parties pay in arbitration are based on the amount
demanded, [Maltby's] numbers may reflect no more than the fact that parties in
arbitration have a strong incentive to be more realistic about their initial demands than
parties in court." CHRISTOPHER DRAHOZAL, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 1-7
(forthcoming 2001).
98 Bingham, The Repeat Player Effect, supra note 75, at 199.
99 Cf Alexander J.S. Colvin, Citizens and Citadels: Institutions, Employment
Strategies, and the Adoption of Nonunion Dispute Resolution Procedures 30
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author) ("[T]he presence of nonunion arbitration
procedures has a significant positive association with" two "variables representing the
litigation threat": the implied contract exception to employment at will, and the
percentage of employees who are female).
756
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more (or less) capable of paying a large verdict.100 Any of these differences
might plausibly correlate with whether the employer uses arbitration
agreements. And any of these differences might well affect the level of
awards or the level of process costs. In sum, there are many plausible
reasons to doubt that the employment cases going to arbitration are
comparable to those going to litigation. 101
The essential point is simple. The very fact that one employer, but not
the other, thought about employment arbitration and instituted a policy of
pre-dispute arbitration agreements should not be ignored. Yet any empirical
study has to ignore it. Any empirical study has to assume that fact away.
For this reason, empirical studies are, at best, an incomplete route
toward understanding the effects of the Gilmer rule. Empirical studies are
vulnerable to the possibility that the studied cases going to arbitration are
systematically different from the studied cases going to litigation. This will
remain true as long as the law allows contracts to determine whether or not a
case goes to arbitration.
V. CONCLUSION
Gilmer opponents assert that arbitration lowers awards in comparable
cases, while Gilmer proponents assert that arbitration lowers employers'
100 Id at 29 ("[T]he only statistically significant relationship for the size of the
[employer] is a negative association with the presence of nonunion arbitration").
101 Even if the cases in which arbitration is commenced are comparable to those in
which litigation is commenced, those that. settle before arbitration concludes may be
systematically different from those that settle before litigation concludes. For example,
the standard economic analysis of settlement holds that settlement rates correlate with the
cost of adjudication and the predictability of adjudication. RICHARD A. POSNER,
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 21.5 (5th ed. 1998). If arbitration is both less costly and
less predictable than litigation, then economic analysis predicts lower settlement rates in
arbitration than in litigation. This is consistent with data from William Howard's survey
of employment lawyers. See Howard, Mandatory Arbitration of Employment
Discrimination Disputes, supra note 85, at 139 (finding a 79-84% settlement rate in
litigation and 31-44% settlement rate in arbitration). If a much lowei percentage of
arbitrated cases settle then one must ask whether they are a representative sample of the
larger group of cases that would have settled in litigation had there been no Gilmer rule.
If cases that settle before arbitration concludes are systematically different from
those that settle before litigation concludes, then a probative comparison of employment
arbitration and employment litigation would have to compare the results of settlement as
well as the results of adjudication. Settlement data, ho~iever, is nearly always unavailable
to researchers. Howard, Mandatory Arbitration of Employment Discrimination Disputes,
supra note 85, at 1-31.
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process costs in comparable cases. Either, neither, or both of these assertions
may be correct. Attempts to test these assertions empirically have been
inconclusive. Further empirical studies of employment arbitration will be
similarly inconclusive because of the real possibility that the studied cases
going to arbitration are systematically different from the studied cases going
to litigation. Therefore, we should resist the temptation to call (as so many
academic articles do) for "more empirical research." And we should be
skeptical of both Gilmer proponents who deny the possibility that arbitration
harms protected-class employees and Gilmer opponents who deny the
possibility that arbitration benefits anyone other than employers.
